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Preface 
 
Abstract 
With computer network’s fast penetration into our life, various types of malicious 
attacks and service abuses increase dramatically. Network security has become one of 
the big challenges in the modern networks. Intrusion Detection (ID) is one of the 
active branches in network security research field. Many technologies, such as neural 
networks, fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms have been applied in intrusion detection 
and the results are varied. In this thesis, an Artificial Immune System (AIS) based 
intrusion detection is explored. AIS is a bio-inspired computing paradigm that has 
been applied in many different areas including intrusion detection. The main objective 
of our research is to improve the AIS based Intrusion Detection System’s (IDS) 
performance on detection while keeping its system computing complexity to a low 
level.  
An IDS requires specified monitoring parameter set. In a computer network, there 
are many parameters can be collected or monitored. The quantity of parameters could 
be real big. These parameters can be used for the intrusion detection purpose.  
However, the significance of these parameters in intrusion detection can be very 
different. If all parameters were used, the computing complexity of IDS would be 
high. Therefore the selection of a group of significant parameters is necessary. This 
process is called feature selection.  Two feature selection algorithms, i.e. Rough set 
algorithm (RSA) and linear genetic programming (LPG) are selected and compared in 
this thesis. An improved AIS based IDS with these two feature selection algorithms 
are studied.  
A basic feature selection algorithm only picks the features to be used, assuming 
they have equal contribution towards the system performance and that is not the case 
in reality. Therefore weighing the parameters’ contribution in the IDS is expected to 
further improve the performance. However, assigning weights to the selected features 
is not an easy work. In this thesis, a weight distribution scheme among selected 
features is proposed. With a simplified exhausted approach, an optimal weight 
allocation is obtained. The results show that the improved AIS based IDS with 
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weighted feature selection can achieve 99.98 % of true positive rate while keeping the 
true negative rate at 99.94%. These results are obtained from the experiment on the 
popular testing dataset: KDD Cup 99. The results indicate the proposed scheme 
outperforms most of the existing IDS on the same testing data set. 
 
  
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 v 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the work presented in this thesis, except where due 
acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; the work has 
not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic 
award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since 
the official commencement date of the approved research program; and, any editorial 
work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and, ethics 
procedures and guidelines have been followed. 
 
 
Signature:          _________________________ 
   Junyuan Shen  
Date:  1/28/2012 
  
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 vi 
Acknowledgement 
 
This research would not have been possible without the support of my 
supervisor, Dr Jidong Wang from the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude for his patient guidance, suggestions and 
support during the progress of the research. This also extends to all the staff of the 
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering and RMIT University. 
Also, I would like to thank to my parents for all their support and 
encouragement during my research time. 
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 vii 
Table of Contents 
Preface ........................................................................................................................... iii	  
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... iii	  
Declaration ................................................................................................................. v	  
Acknowledgement ..................................................................................................... vi	  
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................... vii	  
Table of Figures ......................................................................................................... ix	  
Table of Tables ........................................................................................................... x	  
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. xi	  
1	   Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1	  
1.1	   Scope ................................................................................................................. 2	  
1.2	   Thesis Outline .................................................................................................... 3	  
2	   Network Security and Intrusion Detection Systems ................................................. 4	  
2.1	   Network Security ............................................................................................... 4	  
2.1.1	   User Authentication .................................................................................... 4	  
2.1.2	   Data Encryption .......................................................................................... 4	  
2.1.3	   Firewalls ..................................................................................................... 5	  
2.2	   Intrusion Detection Systems .............................................................................. 6	  
2.2.1	   Misuse Detection ........................................................................................ 7	  
2.2.2	   Anomaly Detection ..................................................................................... 8	  
2.2.3	   Types of Network Intrusion ....................................................................... 9	  
2.2.4	   Terminology of the IDS ............................................................................. 9	  
2.2.5	   Current Intrusion Detection Systems Issues ............................................. 10	  
3	   Artificial Immune System ...................................................................................... 11	  
3.1	   A Brief History of AIS .................................................................................... 11	  
3.2	   Biological underpinnings of AIS ..................................................................... 12	  
3.2.1	   Negative Selection Algorithm .................................................................. 12	  
3.2.2	   Clonal Selection Algorithm ...................................................................... 14	  
3.2.3	   Immune Networks Algorithm .................................................................. 15	  
3.3	   AIS Applications ............................................................................................. 15	  
4	   Efficient AIS Based IDS (EAI) .............................................................................. 18	  
4.1	   Experiment Data .............................................................................................. 18	  
4.1.1	   The KDD Cup 99 Data Set ....................................................................... 19	  
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 viii 
4.2	   Data Preprocessing .......................................................................................... 22	  
4.2.1	   Feature Selection ...................................................................................... 23	  
4.3	   Efficient AIS Based IDS ................................................................................. 29	  
4.3.1	   Normal Data Gathering Step .................................................................... 29	  
4.3.2	   Detector Generation Step ......................................................................... 29	  
4.3.3	   Abnormal Detecting Step ......................................................................... 30	  
4.4	   System performance of the EAI ...................................................................... 31	  
4.4.1	   EAI using RSA ......................................................................................... 31	  
4.4.2	   EAI using LGP algorithm ......................................................................... 32	  
4.5	   Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 32	  
5	   Weighted Feature Selection for EAI ...................................................................... 34	  
5.1	   Methodology .................................................................................................... 34	  
5.1.1	   Weight distribution for RSA feature set ................................................... 35	  
5.1.2	   Weight distribution for LGP Feature Set ................................................. 41	  
5.2	   Discussion ........................................................................................................ 47	  
6	   Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 49	  
7	   References: ............................................................................................................. 51	  
Appendix A  ................................................................................................................. 54	  
Appendix B    ................................................................................................................ 59	  
 
  
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 ix 
Table of Figures 
Figure 2-1 Basic firewall architecture ............................................................................ 6	  
Figure 3-1 Gene Expression Process [16] .................................................................... 12	  
Figure 3-2 The principle of negative selection algorithm ............................................ 13	  
Figure 5-1 Detection results with various "service" parameter weight ........................ 35	  
Figure 5-2 Detection results with various “flag " parameter weight ............................ 36	  
Figure 5-3 Detection results with various "src_byte" parameter weight ...................... 36	  
Figure 5-4 Detection results with various "srv_count" parameter weight ................... 37	  
Figure 5-5 Detection results with various "dst_host_count" parameter weight ........... 37	  
Figure 5-6 Detection results with various "dst_host_srv_rerror_rate" parameter weight
 .............................................................................................................................. 38	  
Figure 5-7 IDS performance with different weight combinations for parameters 
service, src_bytes and dst_host_count from RSA feature set .............................. 39	  
Figure 5-8 Detection results with various “service” parameter weight ........................ 42	  
Figure 5-9 Detection results with various "src_byte" parameter weight ...................... 42	  
Figure 5-10 Detection results with various "logged_in" parameter weight ................. 43	  
Figure 5-11 Detection results with various "rerror_rate" parameter weight ................ 43	  
Figure 5-12 Detection results with various "srv_diff_host_rate" parameter weight .... 44	  
Figure 5-13 Detection results with various "dst_host_diff_srv_rate" parameter weight
 .............................................................................................................................. 44	  
Figure 5-14 IDS performance with different weight combinations for parameters 
service, src_byte, and srv_diff_host_rate from LGP feature set .......................... 45	  
  
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 x 
Table of Tables 
Table 3-1 Application areas of AIS .............................................................................. 16	  
Table 4-1 The KDD Cup 99 parameters ....................................................................... 20	  
Table 4-2 IDS performance using RSA feature selection [34] ..................................... 27	  
Table 4-3 IDS performance using LGP ........................................................................ 28	  
Table 4-4 System Performance of EAI using RSA ...................................................... 32	  
Table 4-5 System Performance of EAI using LGP ...................................................... 32	  
Table 5-1 Attack detection range for each single changed parameter in RSA ............. 38	  
Table 5-2 Value of the weight coefficient combination for EAI with weighted RSA . 39	  
Table 5-3 EAI performance of weight based RSA Feature set and normal RSA Feature 
Set ......................................................................................................................... 41	  
Table 5-4 Attack detection range for each single changed parameter in LGP ............. 45	  
Table 5-5 Value of the weight coefficient combination for EAI with weighted LGP . 46	  
Table 5-6 EAI performance of weight based LGP Feature set and normal LGP Feature 
Set ......................................................................................................................... 47	  
Table 5-7 Comparisons of EAI with weighted features and other IDS systems .......... 48	  
 
 
  ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 xi 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AIS                  artificial immune system 
ANN                artificial neural networks 
APCs               antigen presenting cells 
B cell               bone marrow cell 
BN                   Bayesian network 
CART              classification and regression trees 
CE                    classification Error 
CNF                 conjunction normal form 
DBMS             database management system 
DoS                 denial of service 
EA                   evolutionary algorithms 
EAI                  Efficient AIS Based IDS 
GA                   genetic algorithm 
GP                   genetic programming 
IDS                  intrusion detection system 
ICARIS           international conference on artificial immune systems 
LAN                local area network 
LGP                 linear genetic programming 
MARS             multivariate adaptive regression splines 
MCE                mean classification error 
R2L                 remote to user 
SIP                  session initiation protocol 
SVDF              support vector decision function ranking 
SVM                support vector machines 
T cell               thymus cell 
U2R                 user to root 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 ©2011 Junyuan Shen                                                                                                 1 
1 Introduction 
Driven by the rapid growth of the computer network technologies, the security of 
the computer and network information is becoming increasingly important. The 
appearances of the new access technologies and the advanced devices have increased 
the possibilities of malicious attacks or service abuses by various hackers. Also, with 
the appearances of multimedia services (video, audio, image, text, etc.), a faster, short-
delay anti-virus system is required. However, the traditional passive defence 
mechanisms like encryptions and firewalls cannot fully meet current security 
requirements.  Therefore, a special attack and misuse detection system is needed. The 
intrusion detection system (IDS) is such a system, which is composed by a series of 
devices and software applications to monitor network activities in order to protect the 
system from malicious activities. 
The IDS can detect unauthorized users or processes by comparing the user 
behaviour with a user profile. Two approaches, misuse detection and anomaly 
detection, are usually used in the intrusion detection process. The misuse detection is 
used to detect the intrusion when the behavior of the system matches with any of the 
intrusion signatures in the user profile. And the anomaly detection, which is also 
called as outlier detection [1], is used to detect the intrusion when the given data set 
does not match with the established normal behavior. 
Various techniques have been used for building IDS, like Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) [2], Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) [3], and 
Linear Genetic Programming (LGP) [4], etc. In recent years, the bio-inspired 
algorithms, such as Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), 
have been widely studied and applied in intrusion detection to reduce the labor costs 
and increase the system efficiency. In this thesis, the study is around Bio-inspired IDS 
technology.  The focus is on applying Artificial Immune System (AIS) on IDS to 
improve the detection performance. AIS was first proposed in mid 1980s. Farmer, 
Packard and Perelson [5], Bersini and Varela’s [6] work have started the area. AIS 
became a subject of its own in mid 90s. It has been defined by de Castro and Timmis 
[7] as: “Adaptive systems inspired by theoretical immunology and observed immune 
functions, principles and models, which are applied to problem solving.” The early 
work of applying AIS to IDS can be found in [8]. A multilayer AIS based IDS was 
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proposed by Dasgupta [9] in order to provide systematic defence. These AIS based 
algorithms have achieved good detection results. But their computing complexity is 
quite high. In IDS, responding time is an important issue. The more complex the 
system, the more computing time and the longer responding time will be. Large 
parameter set in IDS can increase the detection accuracy. However, the more 
parameters used, the more complex the system. The trade-off between the complexity 
and the accuracy is a challenge. 
An improved feature selection based IDS is proposed in this study. The anomaly 
detection of the IDS is set up based on AIS negative selection algorithm. And the 
feature selection algorithm is used to reduce the complexity of the system. A weight 
based rough set and LGP feature selection algorithm is proposed in our scheme. The 
main contribution of the rough set algorithm is its ability of reduction and the main 
advantage of the LGP algorithm is that it can be fast enough to detect real-time 
intrusions. It is assumed that different features have different contributions to the IDS 
performance, so that the coefficient weighting is introduced to improve the detection 
accuracy of the IDS. The higher contribution the feature to the system performance, 
the larger weight coefficient the feature will be given. A systematic testing has been 
done in our study to find out the best combination of the different features and their 
weight coefficients. The improved feature selection based IDS shows high abnormal 
detection rate and relatively low false alarm rate comparing with the other algorithms. 
 
1.1 Scope 
As it was observed, the traditional IDS has the following drawbacks: 1) high 
complexity due to the large normal behaviour profile; 2) relatively low detection 
accuracy; 3) low detection rate for the new patterns. In order to improve the IDS’s 
complexity and detection accuracy, our research has focused on improving the 
following issues: 
• What kind of algorithms should be used to reduce the system’s complexity 
without sacrificing too much detection accuracy? 
• How can we increase the IDS’s detection accuracy? 
• What algorithms should be used to detect the new malicious attack? 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
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The research outcome is to design an improved bio-inspired based intrusion 
detection system to overcome the drawbacks mentioned above. The scope of this 
research includes: 
• Review of current research on the AIS.  
• An investigation of IDS concepts and technology used. 
• Proposal of new AIS based IDS.  
• Investigation of feature selection algorithms. 
• Simulation development using C++.  
o Developing AIS based IDS. 
o Testing different feature selection environment on the IDS. 
o Choosing statistics and collecting results  
• An in-depth performance analysis based on the comparison of the simulation 
results 
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis was organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the current 
network security issues and the background of the intrusion detection system. The 
drawbacks of the current network security system are discussed and the importance of 
the intrusion detection system is introduced. The artificial immune system is 
introduced in Chapter 3. The background and the current applications of artificial 
immune system are discussed. In Chapter 4, the data set used in this experiment is 
introduced. The data pre-processing and feature selection algorithm are also discussed 
in Chapter 4. The improved feature selection based IDS is proposed in Chapter 5. 
Different weight coefficient combinations are tested and discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 gives the summary of this research.  A possible future research works are 
discussed.  
Chapter 2  Network Security and Intrusion Detection Systems 
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2 Network Security and Intrusion Detection Systems 
2.1 Network Security 
With the increasingly vital roles the network-based computer systems played in the 
modern society, the security of the systems becomes more important than ever before. 
The security of the system will be compromised while the intrusion happens. The 
intrusion is defined by Heady et al. [29] as “any set of actions that attempt to 
compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource”. Several intrusion 
prevention techniques have already been used to protect computer systems as the first 
defence line like user authentication, data encryption and firewalls.  
2.1.1 User Authentication 
User authentication is used to verify the identity of users when they try to log onto a 
network in order to protect the computer security. Several techniques have been used to 
prove the identity of the user to the network like passwords, digital certificates, smart 
cards and biometrics. Authentication mechanisms differ in the number of verifiers they 
provide, e.g. single verifier supporting or multiple verifiers supporting. Also, 
mechanisms differ in the assurances they apply.  
Sometimes, the traditional one factor password authentication is not enough due to the 
complexity of the current network environment. So, two-factor authentication is needed. 
The two-factor authentication requires two independent methods to establish the identity 
and the privileges, and it is also called strong authentication. In the two-factor 
authentication, the password is served as a secret word or code that is used to be a 
security measure against the unauthorized access and it is always managed by the 
operating system or DBMS.  
2.1.2 Data Encryption 
Data encryption has changed dramatically over the years, from the military solution 
only to widespread public use. The data encryption method is a fast, easy to use and 
secure way for network security. Two types of cryptography mechanisms can make the 
data invisible: secret-key and public-key. 
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For the secret-key cryptography system, if the sender wants to send a message to 
someone, it will first encrypt the message by using a secret-key, and the receiver will 
decrypt the encrypted message by using the same secret-key. This method is also known 
as symmetric cryptography. The main problem for the secret-key cryptography is that the 
sender and the receiver have to use a secure channel to exchange the secret-key and the 
secure channel is hard to find. For this reason, another cryptography system was 
invented called public-key cryptography system. 
 For the public-key cryptography system, each part will get two keys, public-key and 
private-key. The public-key is published to all the nodes in the system, and whoever 
wants to send a message to the receiver can use the receiver’s public key. Then the 
receiver can decrypt the message by using its private-key. The RSA public-key 
cryptosystem is the most popular form of public-key cryptography. 
The RSA stands for Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, who proposed 
this algorithm first in 1978. It is an asymmetric encryption algorithm. A user of RSA 
needs to create the product of two large prime numbers, along with an auxiliary value 
served as the public key. After the public key is generated, the prime factors can be 
ruined. Anyone who wants to transfer information to the RSA user can use the public 
key to encrypt the message. The difficulty of factoring large integers determines the 
reliability of the RSA algorithm. There is not any reliable way to attack the RSA 
algorithm.   
2.1.3 Firewalls 
 Firewall system is an important component of the network security to protect the 
network from the outside world. The firewalls provide strict accessing control between 
enterprise networks and Internet. All traffics pass through the firewalls will be monitored 
and controlled.  
The common firewall architecture contains at least four components: the exterior 
router, an interior router, an exposed network and a secure server, each of which 
provides part of the complete security scheme. The architecture is shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1 Basic firewall architecture 
Several distinct advantages can be achieved by implementing the firewall into the 
network. Firstly, it is more secure to add a firewall than an average host. A second 
advantage comes from that the firewall machines have professional administration than 
the average system administrator. Also, the firewall, the gateway machine, need not be 
trusted by any other machines, which means even if the firewall has been compromised, 
no others will fall automatically.  
Although firewall is a powerful tool for network security, it still has its limitations. 
One of these limitations is that a firewall has a very strong defence against attacks from 
lower level, while, for the problems from the higher level, it almost provide no 
protection. Also, the firewall can defence against the known flaws well, but for the new 
ones, it might be useless. So, it needs to be upgraded regularly.  
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 
For modern computer networks, the traditional intrusion prevention techniques are 
struggling as the system is becoming more and more complex. New efficient intrusion 
detection systems are needed as second layer defence. The main advantages of using 
intrusion detection systems include: 
• Real-time reporting of break-ins in order to have timely countermeasures to 
protect important information. 
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• Identifying the trace of the intrusions so that the system administrators can 
identify the intruders and eliminate the security holes. 
The most popular techniques to detect intrusions are done by using audit data that is 
generated by operating systems or by networks. For example, Lunt et al.[30] proposed 
the IDES which requires to use audit trails generate by a C21 or higher rated computer. 
There are also other techniques to detect intrusions like monitoring the network 
connections or information flows, like the Bro system proposed by Paxson [31]. 
The intrusion detection system can also help to analyse the audit data even after the 
attack happened in order to determine the extent of the damages occurred. The analysis 
is important because it will help for future prevention of such kind of attacks. This makes 
the intrusion detection systems not only a real-time detection mechanism but also a 
system-analysing tool.  
The intrusion detection approach is classified into two types: misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. 
2.2.1 Misuse Detection 
The misuse detection is used to detect the intrusion when the behavior of the system 
matches with any of the intrusion signatures. The misuse detection system consists of the 
specific patterns of the known system vulnerabilities, then monitoring the current 
activities of such patterns. If the current activities match with any pattern in the alarm 
pattern database, an alarm will be raised. Most current misuse detection utilizes some 
form of the rule-based analysis. The NIDES system proposed by Lunt [32] can be used 
an example. It uses a rule-based algorithm for misuse detection. First, the system 
encodes the existing known vulnerabilities and attack types into rules. Then, the audit 
data will be compared with the rule conditions to determine whether an intrusion 
occurred or not. For the rule-based approach, a comprehensive rule set is critical in the 
application of expert systems for intrusion detection.  
The key advantage of the misuse detection is that it can detect the known attacks 
accurately and rapidly. Unfortunately, by the nature of misuse detection, it is not very 
effective in detecting innovative attacks. So, the misuse detection system requires 
updating frequently. The lack of update will degrade the security level of the entire 
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system. The situation of current networks is that new attack techniques are appearing 
more and more frequently, so the misuse intrusion systems may need to be updated 
across many platforms more often than ever before. This will cause very labor intensive 
for constructing and maintaining a misuse detection system.  
2.2.2 Anomaly Detection 
The anomaly detection is used to detect the intrusion when the given data set does 
not match with the established normal behavior. The anomaly detection consists of a 
normal behavior profile that includes the specific normal patterns of the network, then 
the monitored patterns will be compared with the normal behavior profile. If the 
monitored patterns do not conform to the normal behavior profile, these non-conforming 
patterns will be referred to as anomalies.  Although the approach of anomaly detection 
looks straightforward, there are still several factors make it challenge:  
• It is very difficult to build a normal behavior profile that contains every 
possible normal behavior.  
• The boundary between normal and abnormal behavior is not precise in some 
time.  
• The malicious adversaries will often adapt themselves to appear like normal, 
so that it makes it more difficult to distinguish.  
• The normal behavior might keep evolving, so the current knowledge of the 
normal behavior might not be sufficiently enough to represent all the normal 
behaviors in the future. 
Due to the challenges mentioned above, the anomaly detection system is not easy to 
build. Therefore, the current existing anomaly detection techniques will always focusing 
on a specific area like anomaly detection for IP networks, or anomaly detection for SIP 
networks. 
However, the anomaly detection systems do have their own advantages. They can 
detect unknown intrusions because a priori knowledge about specific intrusions is not 
required. Also, by adding the statistical-based algorithm, the anomaly detection system 
will be adaptive to the changing circumstance because it is relatively easier to update the 
statistical measures.  
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Numeric researches have been focused on the anomaly detection area due to its 
ability to detect unknown intrusions. Patcha and Park [33] present a survey of current 
anomaly detection techniques focusing on the computer network intrusion detections. 
NIDES proposed by Lunt [32] is an anomaly detection system that uses a statistically 
measured user normal profile. Zainal et al. [34] introduced the feature selection 
algorithm into the anomaly detection system.  
2.2.3 Types of Network Intrusion 
In practice, the network intrusion includes six types. 
1. Misuse/abuse: misuse or abuse happens when unauthorized activities done 
by authorized users. For example, the theft of information.  
2. Reconnaissance: reconnaissance occurs when an intruder try to determine 
whether the system or services can be exploitable. 
3. Penetration attempt: penetration attempt occurs when the unauthorized 
activity tries to gain access to the computing resources. 
4. Penetration: penetration occurs when unauthorized users successfully access 
to the computer resources. 
5. Trojanization: trojanization happens when unauthorized processes can 
present and active.  
6. Denial of service (DoS): denial of service happens when attacks influence 
the legitimate users to access the computing resources. 
2.2.4 Terminology of the IDS 
In order to describe the performance of the intrusion detection system, several 
terminologies are introduced: 
• Alarm: A signal suggesting that a system has been or is being attacked. 
• True Positive: A legitimate attack that triggers an IDS to produce an alarm. 
• False Positive: An event signaling an IDS to produce an alarm when no 
attack has taken place. 
• False Negative: A failure of an IDS to detect an actual attack. 
• True Negative: When no attack has taken place and no alarm is raised. 
• Noise: Data or interference that can trigger a false positive. 
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• Site policy: Guidelines within an organization that control the rules and 
configurations of an IDS. 
• Site policy awareness: An IDS's ability to dynamically change its rules and 
configurations in response to changing environmental activity. 
• Confidence value: A value an organization places on an IDS based on past 
performance and analysis to help determine its ability to effectively identify 
an attack. 
• Alarm filtering: The process of categorizing attack alerts produced from an 
IDS in order to distinguish false positives from actual attacks. [35] 
 
2.2.5 Current Intrusion Detection Systems Issues 
The quality of an IDS can be measured by its effectiveness, adaptability and 
extensibility. For the effectiveness issue, the IDS should have high true positive rate and 
low positive rate (false alarm rate). For the adaptive issue, the IDS should have the 
ability to detect both known intrusions and can quickly adapt to innovation intrusions.  
Because of the increasing complexity of the modern networks, the current expert 
knowledge based IDS are usually incomplete and not precise enough. The trend of 
focusing on solving the “current” vulnerabilities makes the current IDS unable to detect 
“future” attacks. In order to overcome these drawbacks, an AIS based IDS is proposed. 
By introducing the artificial immune systems into the IDS, the adaptive issue can be 
solved by using the negative selection algorithm. The immunology algorithms help to 
increase the systems’ effectiveness. 
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3 Artificial Immune System 
This chapter provides a brief introduction of the artificial immune system. The 
artificial immune system is a branch of bio-inspired computational intelligence, and it 
has attracted increasingly interest from the researchers after it was first proposed. A 
number of researches have been focused on the AIS area, ranging from modeling natural 
immune systems, solving artificial related problems, to anomaly detection, and 
controlling.  
 
3.1 A Brief History of AIS 
Artificial Immune System (AIS) is a various area of researches that attempt to build 
a bridge between immunology and engineering by using the techniques like 
mathematical and computational modeling of immunology.  
The origin of AIS is rooted in the early theoretical work of J.D. Farmer, N.H. 
Packard, A.S. Perelson [10, 11] and F. Varela, A. Coutinho, B. Dupire, N. Vaz [12]. It 
was first proposed in mid 1980s and became a subject of its own in mid 90s. Originally, 
AIS was aimed to find efficient abstractions of processes in the immune system,e.g [13] 
whilst by carefully reviewing the successful of this efficient natural mechanism, an 
increasing number of computer scientists proposed artificial immune based computer 
models to solve various problems ranging from virus detection, fault analyzing to 
clustering. Two researchers played an important role in crossing the divide between 
computing and immunology who are Hugues Bersini and Stephanie Forrest. Bersini and 
Forrest did a lot of basic works rooted from immunology and their works formed a solid 
foundation of the area of AIS. With regards to Bersini, he was focusing on the basic 
theory of immune network and examining how the immune system maintained its 
memory and how to build a model to mimic that progress.  And for Forrest, she was 
focusing on the application area of the AIS. She proposed the idea of introducing the 
immune system into the computer security area by using its ability to distinguish 
between self and non-self. AIS has been defined by Castro and Timmis [14] as: 
“Adaptive systems inspired by theoretical immunology and observed immune functions, 
principles and models, which are applied to problem solving.”  
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The International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems (ICARIS) was started 
in 2002 due to the growing amount of work conducted on the AIS area, and the 
conference series continues to operate to now. The ICARIS aims to provide a forum for 
AIS researchers to present and discuss their latest advances.  
3.2 Biological underpinnings of AIS 
Three main immunological theories have been focused by AIS, which are negative 
selection, clonal selection and immune networks. AIS researchers focus on clonal 
selection and immune networks because of their inherent learning and memory 
mechanisms. And for negative selection, researchers are interested in the generation of 
detectors that are capable to classify changes in self. The negative selection, clonal 
selection and immune networks will be detail discussed in the following section. 
3.2.1 Negative Selection Algorithm 
The important character of the human immune system is that it can maintain its 
diversity and generality, and it can detect a large number of antigens by using a small 
number of antibodies. In order to make it possible, several functions will be processed 
[15].  One of those functions is to develop the antibodies through the gene library. The 
gene library will be used in creating thymus cell (T cell) and bone marrow cell (B cell). 
While creating a new antibody, the gene segments in the gene library will be randomly 
selected and assembled. As shown in Figure 3-1, large number of antibodies can be 
generated from combining different gene segments in the gene library.  
 
Figure 3-1 Gene Expression Process [16] 
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However, one problem will appear due to the full immune response above. As well 
as responding to harmful antigens, those newly generated antibody may also react to 
self-cells coming from the host. In order to protect the body from self-reactive, the 
human immune system produces the negative selection. The negative selection of T cells 
occurs within the thymus. After the immature T cell is generated, it will be compared 
with the self-peptide presented by antigen presenting cells (APCs). Those that bind to 
self-peptide (have high affinity) will be eliminated through a controlled death. Only 
those do not have self-reactive and can recognize antigens will be distributed throughout 
the human body. Therefore, this process forms the foundation of the AIS work.  
By observing the similarities between the elimination harmful antibodies in human 
body and the anomaly detection, Forrest, Hofmeyr, and Somayaji [17] proposed the 
negative selection algorithm for anomaly detection. The artificial negative selection is 
focusing on the generation of the detectors and the detectors are intended to use to detect 
anomaly patterns. The algorithm of artificial negative selection is as follows,  
1. Create a set of self strings (S). 
2. Randomly generated a set of strings (R). 
3.  For those r! ∈ R, if under certain matching algorithms, r! does not match 
with any s ∈ S, then, r! will be saved in the detector set (D). Otherwise, r! 
will be rejected. 
The steps above can be described in Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2 The principle of negative selection algorithm 
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As shown in Figure 3-2, the matching algorithm is the core of the negative selection. 
The affinity between the random string !  and self-string S   is decided by using a 
matching algorithm. Several algorithms have been proposed in this area to determine the 
affinity. Among the popular ones are Eucliden algorithm, hamming distance algorithm 
and r-contiguous bit rule algorithm. The Affinities of the ! and S   are related to the 
distance between them. The definition of the distance can be shown as follows, 
Let R=<!!, !!… !!>, S=<!!, !!… !!>, 
• Eucliden  D = (r0 ! s0 )2
i=0
m
"
                                                                                (3-1)
 
• Manhattan D = r0 ! s0
i=0
m
"
                                                                                    (3-2)
 
• HammingD = !
i=0
m
! , where δ = 10 if 
r0 ! s0
otherwise                                             (3-3)
 
For the negative selection, if the sum of distance between ! and the S is equal or 
lager then a threshold, the ! will be eliminated. Otherwise, the ! will be kept as a 
detector. 
3.2.2 Clonal Selection Algorithm 
The clonal selection theory is used to explain the response to an antigenic stimulus 
in the adaptive immune system. It performs well in the computational optimization and 
pattern recognition areas (e.g. B Cell Algorithm [19]). 
The idea is that only those cells capable of recognizing an antigen will proliferate, 
while others that do not recognize an antigen are selected against [18]. When a human 
body is exposed to an antigen, the bone marrow derived cells (B cell) will respond by 
producing antibodies (Ab). By binding with these antibodies, the antigen will stimulate 
the B cell to proliferate. In the B cell cloning process, they will undergo somatic 
hypermutation to introduce diversity into the B cell population. From the computational 
point of view, two important features in the B cell’s affinity maturation can be exploited. 
The first one is that the B cell’s proliferation is proportional to the affinity of the antigen 
that binds it, which means the higher the affinity is, the more clones will be produced. 
Secondly, the mutations suffered by the antibody of a B-cell are inversely proportional to 
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the affinity of the antigen it binds. By applying these two features, de Castro and Von 
Zuben [20] proposed the clonal selection based AIS called CLONALG. de Castro and 
Timmis use the CLONALG to perform pattern matching and multi-modal function 
optimization in [21]. 
3.2.3 Immune Networks Algorithm 
In 1974, Niels Kaj Jerne proposed an immune network theory in the landmark paper 
[22]. The immune network algorithm helps to explain some of the observed emergent 
properties of the immune system like learning and memory. The algorithm is focusing on 
the network graph structures involved where antibodies represent the nodes, and the 
training algorithm involves growing or pruning edges between the nodes based on 
affinity. The immune networks algorithm performs well in the area of clustering, data 
visualization, controlling, and optimization domains.   
The algorithm aiNet, inspired by the immune network theory, is one of the most 
popular clustering algorithms. The aiNet was developed by de Castro and von Zuben [23] 
in order to find a reduced set of points that closely represents the input set of points. In 
aiNet, immune learning and memory are consequences of network interactions and 
antigenic stimulation, also bridging a gap between the originally conflicting theories of 
clonal selection and idiotypic networks.  
3.3 AIS Applications  
As a new paradigm, there have been a lot of successful applications in AIS. By 
comparing with other existing bio-inspired paradigms like Evolutionary Algorithms 
(EA), Neural Networks (NN), and other traditional classification or clustering 
algorithms, AIS performs well in several fields (Table 3-1). The categories shown in 
Table 3-1 can be briefly summarized in three big domains: learning, anomaly detection 
and optimization.  Those three domains can map to the three main algorithms in Section 
3.2. In the Learning domain, it includes clustering/classification, robotics, controlling 
and pattern recognition applications. Anomaly detection domain includes virus detection 
and computer and network security applications. The optimization domain contains 
numeric function optimization and real world problems especially on the combinatoric 
area. 
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Table 3-1 Application areas of AIS 
Major Minor 
Clustering/ Classification 
Anomaly Detection 
Computer Security 
Numeric Function Optimisation 
Combinatoric Optimisation 
Learning 
Bio-informatics 
Image Processing 
Robotics 
Controlling 
Virus Detection 
Web Mining 
 
In this project, the focus is on the anomaly detection area using AIS, which is a hot 
research area. For anomaly detection, it requires to decide whether an unknown pattern 
reflects a normal behavior or an intrusion. The AIS based anomaly detection relies on a 
detector set which is created using a known normal pattern set (or class) beforehand. The 
live IDS is expected to detect any intrusion pattern when it occurs.  
The pioneering works done by Forrest, Perelson and Allen [24] led to a great deal of 
research and proposal of immune inspired anomaly detection systems [25]. These works 
hint the possibility that the immune based approach might be useful to solve the intrusion 
detection problem to some degree. More work has been done by Kim and Bentley [26], 
which use the clonal selection algorithm and negative selection algorithms together to 
reduce the false positive rate. Also, several researchers have focusing on improving the 
matching algorithms in order to improve the performance of the system. Balthrop et al. 
[27] proposed the r-chunk matching rule to replace the r-contiguous bits matching rule in 
order to reduce the computational complexity. D’haeseleer, Forrest and Helman [28] 
showed several advantages of AIS based anomaly detection. One of the most important 
one is that the AIS based anomaly detection does not define specific anomalies to be 
detected, which means it does not require the pre-knowledge of the anomalies. This 
feature allows the AIS based anomaly detection system to be able to detect the 
previously unseen anomalies.  
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Still, the AIS based anomaly detection has some drawbacks like scaling issues, high 
false positive rates and also complexity issues. Stibor, Timmis, and Eckert [36] proposed 
that on testing high-dimensional data set (such as KDD Cup 99), the negative selection 
has very poor performance comparing with other techniques. But when the problem size 
scales down, the performance impact factor will decreases to almost zero. Some 
researchers have proposed the danger theory approach to overcome some of these 
drawbacks [37][38]. They assume that the traditional methods in determining what is 
‘normal’ for a system should be moved away, and a dynamically identifying ‘normal’ 
should be used through the adoption of danger signals.    
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4 Efficient AIS Based IDS (EAI) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the negative selection used in AIS has its intrinsic 
advantages in dealing with network intrusion detection problems. In this project, the 
exploration on AIS based intrusion detection system is to further improve the IDS’s 
performance and system complexity.  
AIS based intrusion detection system can be split into the following steps: 
1. Normal Data Set Gathering: In this step, the data set of parameters on normal 
behaviour of the system will be collected. These data will be used in the 
negative selection process. 
2. Detector Generation: In this step, the detectors of the IDS will be generated 
based on the negative selection algorithm and stored in the system memory. 
3.  Live Detection: The detectors of the IDS will be used in monitoring the 
networks. The network live data will be compared with the detectors in order 
to detect abnormality. 
Before establishing the intrusion detection systems, some fundamental issues should 
be considered, e.g. what kind of network environment our IDS will work in, or how we 
test our IDS, or what kind of data do we want to use. All of these issues are related to the 
chosen of experiment data.  
4.1 Experiment Data 
Generally speaking, two approaches can be used to gather the experiment data, each 
of which has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The first method is to gather the experiment data from an experimental environment 
where a virtual network is created and network packet capturing tools can be used to 
obtain the monitoring parameters. Several researchers have used this method. Kim and 
Bentley [16] used tcpdump as the data packet-capturing tool in their experiment. The 
TCP packet passed between the intra-LAN and external networks are all collected in 
their scheme. All the data collected by the tcpdump will have the tcpdump format such as 
time stamp, source and destination IP address, source and destination port number etc. 
Martin Roesch developed the snort, an open-source IDS, based on the tcpdump.  
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The advantage of this method is that the researchers can collect as many data as they 
want for the training or testing purposes. But the disadvantages are also obvious. The 
laboratory virtual networks are not real-world networks so that the IDS might perform 
well in the laboratory environment but it might not fit for the real networks. Also, it is 
hard for the researches to compare their IDS with other IDS because the different testing 
environment they use.  
The second method is to use the existing data set provided by some laboratory 
specific for network intrusion detection issue. The most widely used data set for 
intrusion detection is the Knowledge Discovery and Data mining 1999 data set (KDD 
Cup 99). The KDD Cup 99 data set contains a rich set of different attack data types and 
normal data, which can fulfill the training and testing purpose for researches. Betanzos 
et.al.[40], Shyu et.al.[41], and Saravanan [42] are all use KDD Cup 99 data set as their 
training and testing data.  
The advantage of using the existing well-accepted data set is that the researchers can 
easily compare their IDS performance with others so that the result of the experiment 
will be more convincing. Also, it will save a lot of time in gathering data. Unfortunately, 
by using the existing data set, it is hard for the researchers to add new data, and they 
have to wait the upgrade package from the laboratory.  
By comparing the two methods, the existing well-accepted data set has more 
advantages as the performance of the IDS can be easily compared with other schemes.  
Therefore, the KDD Cup 99 data set is selected in our experiment. 
4.1.1 The KDD Cup 99 Data Set 
The KDD Cup 99 data set is the most widely used data set for network-based 
intrusion detection. This data set is built based on the data captured in DARPA’98 IDS 
evaluation program [43]. The DARPA’98 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program was 
managed by MIT Lincoln Labs. It aims to survey and evaluate the researches in the 
intrusion detection area. Lincoln Labs set up an environment to acquire nine weeks of 
raw TCP dump data for a local-area network (LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air Force 
LAN.  They operated the LAN as if it were a true Air Force environment, but peppered it 
with multiple attacks [44]. The data set contains 24 training attack types and 14 
additional attack types in the test data only. These attacks fall into four main categories: 
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1. Denial of service (DOS): In this type of attack, an attacker makes some 
computing or memory resources too busy or too full to handle legitimate 
requests, or denies legitimate users access to a machine. Examples are Apache2, 
Back, Land, Mailbomb, SYN Flood, Ping of death, Process table and Smurf. 
2. Remote to user (R2L): In this type of attack, an attacker who does not have an 
account on a remote machine sends packets to that machine over a network and 
exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as a user of that machine. 
Examples are Dictionary, Ftp_write, Guest, Imap, Named, Phf, Sendmail and 
Xlock. 
3. User to root (U2R): In this type of attacks, an attacker starts out with access to a 
normal user account on the system and is able to exploit system vulnerabilities to 
gain root access to the system. Examples are Eject, Loadmodule, Ps, Xterm, Perl 
and Fdformat. 
4. Probing: In this type of attacks, an attacker scans a network of computers to 
gather information or find known vulnerabilities. An attacker with a map of 
machines and services that are available on a network can use this information to 
look for exploits. Examples are Ipsweep, Mscan, Saint, Satan, Imap. 
 
For each record in the KDD Cup 99 data set, it contains 41 parameters and a data 
type at the end of each record, shown as follows: 
• 0,tcp,http,SF,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0
.00,0.00,9,9,1.00,0.00,0.11,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal.	  
• 0,icmp,ecr_i,SF,1032,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,511,511,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1
.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,smurf.	  
• 0,tcp,http,SF,239,486,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.
00,0.00,19,19,1.00,0.00,0.05,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal.	  
Each parameter, separated by the comma in the data string, has its own meaning and 
it is shown in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 The KDD Cup 99 parameters 
Parameter Description Parameter Description 
1.Duration Length (number of seconds) of the 
connection. 
2.Protocol_ty
pe 
tcp,udp,icmp 
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3.Service Network service on the destination. 4. Flag Normal or error status of the connection.   
5.Src_bytes Number of data bytes from source to 
destination. 
6. dst_bytes Number of data bytes from destination 
to source. 
7. land 1 represents that the connection is 
from/to the same host/port. 0 
otherwise. 
8.wrong_frag
ment 
Number of wrong fragments. 
9. urgent Number of urgent packets. 10. hot Number of “hot indicators”. 
11.num_failed_
login 
Number of failed login attempts. 12.logged_in 1 represents successfully logged in, 0, 
otherwise. 
13.num_compr
omised 
Number of “compromised” conditions. 14. 
root_shell 
1 represents root shell is obtained. 0, 
otherwise. 
15.su_attempte
d 
1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 
otherwise. 
16. num_root Number of “root” accesses. 
17.num_file_cr
eations 
Number of file creation operations. 18. 
num_shells 
Number of shell prompts. 
19. 
num_access_fil
es 
Number of operations on access 
control files. 
20.num_outb
ound_cmds 
Number of outbound commands in an 
ftp session. 
21.is_hot_login 1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 
0 otherwise. 
22.is_guest_l
ogin 
1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0 
otherwise 
23.count Number of connections to the same 
host as the current connection in the 
past 2 seconds. 
24.srv_count Number of connections to the same 
services as the current connection in the 
past 2 seconds. 
25.serror_rate % of connections that have “SYN” 
errors. 
26.srv_serror
_rate 
% of connections that have “SYN” 
errors. 
27.rerror_rate 
numeric 
% of connections that have “REJ” 
errors. 
28.srv_rerror
_rate  
% of connections that have “REJ” 
errors. 
29.same_srv_ra
te 
% of connections to the same service. 30.diff_srv_r
ate 
% of connections to different services. 
31.srv_diff_hos
t_rate: 
% of connections to different hosts. 32.dst_host_
count 
number of connections from the same 
host to destination during a specified 
time window. 
33.dst_host_srv
_count 
Count of connections having the same 
destination host and using the same 
service 
34.dst_host_
same_srv_rat
e 
% of connections having the same 
destination host and using the same 
service 
35.dst_host_dif
f_srv 
_rate 
% of different services on the current 
host 
36.dst_host_
same_src_po
rt_rate 
% of connections to the current host 
having the same src port 
37.dst_host_srv
_diff_host_rate 
% of connections to the same service 
coming from different hosts 
38.dst_host_
serror_rate 
% of connections to the current host that 
have an S0 error 
39.dst_host_srv
_serror_rate 
% of connections to the current host 
and specified service that have an S0 
error 
40.dst_host_
rerror_rate 
% of connections to the current host that 
have an RST error 
41.dst_host_srv % of connections from the same host   
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_rerror_rate with same service &REJ errors to the 
destination host during a specified time 
window. 
 
4.2 Data Preprocessing 
Although the KDD Cup 99 data set has already undergone an initial data pre-
processing comparing with the raw tcpdump format provided by DARPA data, some 
data pre-processing is still needed in this experiment. The KDD Cup 99 data set contains 
34 numerical features and 7 symbolic features. For the numerical features, they can be 
used straightway. For the symbolic parameters, they need to be transformed into 
numerical ones. In those seven symbolic features, four of them (land, logged_in, 
is_hot_login, is_guest_login in Table 4-1) have only two categories, so a binary 
conversion is enough. The other three symbolic features (protocol, service, flag in Table 
4-1) have more than two categories: 3 categories for protocol, 64 categories for service, 
and 11 categories for flag. In our experiment, they are mapped to numerical values 
ranging from 0 to N-1 where N is the number of symbols. Taking the “flag” parameter 
for example, the C++ code for mapping the 11 categories of flag parameter is shown as 
follows: 
                s_mapStringValues["S0"]=connection_S0_Value0; 
 s_mapStringValues["S1"]=connection_S1_Value1; 
 s_mapStringValues["SF"]=connection_SF_Value2; 
 s_mapStringValues["OTH"]=connection_OTH_Value3; 
 s_mapStringValues["S2"]=connection_S2_Value4; 
 s_mapStringValues["RSTO"]=connection_RSTO_Value5; 
 s_mapStringValues["S3"]=connection_S3_Value6; 
 s_mapStringValues["RSTR"]=connection_RSTR_Value7; 
 s_mapStringValues["RSTOS0"]=connection_RSTOS0_Value8; 
 s_mapStringValues["SH"]=connection_SH_Value9; 
 s_mapStringValues["REJ"]=connection_RSTRH_Value10; 
 
For our experiment, the only parameter quantization is not sufficient enough. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, Stibor, Timmis, and Eckert [36] showed that the negative 
selection would have very poor performance on high-dimensional data set. While for 
KDD Cup 99 data set, they have 42 parameters, which mean 42 dimensions. So, the 
feature selection mechanism is needed to reduce the dimension of the experiment data 
set. Also, by using the feature selection mechanism, the system complexity will be 
reduced in the training progress.  
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4.2.1 Feature Selection 
In modern networks, the number of audit data that an intrusion detection systems 
need to monitor is increasing even in small networks. The analysis is increasingly 
difficult even with high-speed computers. Therefore, the IDS needs to reduce the amount 
of data to be monitored, which is extremely necessary in real-time detection. The raw 
data reduction can be achieved in several steps.  At first, the data that are not considered 
as useful can be filtered. This step is called data filtering. While in this experiment, this 
step is not being considered because the KDD Cup 99 data set is already filtered by the 
Lincoln Lab. The feature selection is to further eliminate some parameters from the data 
set. A feature set will be formed after the feature selection process. The aim is to reduce 
the system complexity while maintaining a good IDS performance. 
In high-dimensional feature domains, some features may have negative correlations 
and that will hinder the process of AIS-based intrusion detection. Also, some information 
is reflected in several features and these features have redundant information. The more 
features input into the IDS, the more computation complex the system will be. Features 
selection in IDS is to select a subset of the features. For distributed IDS, the feature 
selection should analyze the network related information such as  source and destination 
IP addresses, protocol type, duration of the connection, number of data bytes from source 
to destination etc. All these features can be found in the KDD Cup 99 data set (see Table 
4-1). The difficulty of applying feature selection in IDS is to identify which of these 
features are irrelevant or act as a redundancy for IDS, and which of these features have 
contribution or essential for IDS. Even in the case that there are no useless features in the 
raw data, by selection the most important ones might well improve the responding time 
of IDS and maintain the detection accuracy.  
The feature selection problem for IDS that use the KDD Cup 99 data set can be 
characterized in the following: 
• The large number of input data ! = (!!, !!, !!,… , !!") have varying degrees of 
impact on the output of the intrusion detection system !. 
• It is assumed that there should be a mathematical formula that can describe the 
relationships between input data ! and output !, ! = !(!). 
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• By using the large number of data that provided by the KDD Cup 99 data set, 
several important features for the intrusion detection system will be exploited. 
Till now, there is no model or function that can precisely describe the relationships 
between different attacks and features. Many researchers have focused on feature 
selections on IDS. They use the data mining techniques for feature selection. Sung and 
Mukkamala[45] introduced three techniques in the IDS feature selection that are Support 
Vector Decision Function Ranking (SVDF), Linear Genetic Programming (LGP) and 
Multivariate Regression Splines (MARS). Zainal et al. [34] and Zhang et al. [46] 
proposed the feature selection using rough set in intrusion detection. Chebrolu et al. [47] 
used the Bayesian Network (BN) and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) as the 
feature selection tool to solve the real-time IDS issues.  
The work done by the previous researchers show that there are features that have 
significant influence on the IDS performance. And by using different types of feature 
selection algorithms, the selected features from the same data set might be different. 
There are still some problems in the works mentioned above. The most important one is 
that in all the reported works, they just picked up several most important features from 
the specific data set, and they assumed that all those important features would have 
equally contributions on the IDS performance. For example, Chebrolu et al. [47] choose 
four features and Sung and Mukkamala[45] choose six features in testing their IDS. 
According to the feature selection theory, for the reason that different features have 
different contributions on the system output, they should be given different weight. In 
this project, an improved feature selection algorithm using rough set and LGP separately 
is proposed to enhance the performance of an AIS based IDS. 
4.2.1.1 Rough Set Algorithm (RSA) 
Rough set algorithm was proposed by the Polish computer scientist Zdzislaw 
Pawlak in 1982 [48]. It is an extension of conventional set theory and a mathematical 
tool that support approximations in decision making. Also, it suits well for classification 
of objects. The rough set is an approximation of a vague set by a pair of precise concepts, 
which are called lower and upper approximations. The lower approximation is a 
description of the domain objects that are known with certainty to belong to the subset of 
interest, whereas the upper approximation is a description of the objects that possibly 
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belong to the subset [49]. The main contribution of the rough set theory is its ability of 
reduction.  It can provide a minimal subset of attributes that contains the same capability 
of objects classification as the whole set of attributes. The following definitions can 
show how the reductions obtained [48]. 
Definition 1 An information system is defined as a four-tuple as follows, ! =<!,!,!, ! >, where ! = {!!, !!, . . . , !!} is a finite set of objects (n is the number of 
objects); Q is a finite set of attributes, ! = {!!, !!, . . . , !!}; ! =  ∪!∈! !!  and !!  is a 
domain of attribute q;   !:!×! → ! is a total function such that !(!, !)   ∈ !! for each !   ∈ !, !   ∈ !. If the attributes in S can be divided into condition attribute set C and 
decision attribute set D, i.e. ! = ! ∪ ! and ! ∩ ! = !, the information system S is 
called a decision system or decision table. 
Definition 2 Let IND(P), IND(Q) be indiscernible relations determined by attribute 
sets P, Q, the P positive region of Q, denoted !"#  !"#(!)  (!"#(!)) is defined as follows:  
   !"#  !"#(!)  (!"#(!))   =    !"#(!)_(!)!∈!/!"#(!)   .                                      (4-1)    
Definition 3 Let P, Q, R be an attribute set, we say R is a reduct of P relative to Q if 
and only if the following conditions are satisfied: 
1) POS!"# ! IND Q = POS!"# ! IND Q ;                                           (4-2) 
2) ∀r ∈ R follows that !"#!"# !!{!} (!"#(!)) ≠ !"#!"# ! (!"#(!))    (4-3) 
        Definition 4 Let ! = (!,! ∪ ! ,!, !) be a decision system, whose discernibility 
matrix ! ! = [!!!(!, !)]!×! is defined as: 
!!! !, ! = {∅                                                                                                            ! !! !!(!!)  !! !!∈!∧!! !! !!! !! ,!(!!)!!(!!)                                                               (4-4) 
where !! !!  is the value of objects !! on attribute !!,  !(!) is the value of object x on 
decision attribute d. 
Write ! ! = [!!!(!, !)]!×!  as a list {!!, . . . ,!!}.  Each   !!  is called a 
discernibility entry, and is usually written as !! = !!!, . . . ,!!" , where each !!" 
corresponds to a condition attribute of the information system, k=q,...,m; i=1,...,t. 
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Furthermore, the discernibility matrix can be represented by the discernibility 
function f, conjunction normal form (CNF), i.e., ! = !! ∧. . .∧ !!, where each !! = !!! ∨. . .∨ !!" is called a clause, and each !!" is called an atom. Note that the discernibility 
function contains only atoms, but not negations of atoms. Although the discernibility 
matrix and discernibility function have different styles of expression, they are actually 
the same in nature. 
Definition 5 Let h denote any Boolean CNF function of m Boolean variables {!!∗   , . . . ,!!∗   } , composed of n Boolean sums !!,… , !! . Furthermore, let !!"∗ ∈ {0,1} 
denote an indicator variable that states whether !!∗  occurs in !! . !! = !!"∗×!!!! !!∗ , ℎ = !!!!!! . We can interpret ℎ  as a bag or multise !(ℎ) = {!  !|!!   = {!!   ∈ !|!!∗  !""#$%  !"  !!}}. Because the discernibility function  ! is 
also a CNF Boolean function, so it has a multiset. Let !(!)denote the multiset of 
discernibility function !, ! ! = { !!!,… ,!!! ,… , !!!,… ,!!" ,… , {!!!,… ,!!"}}. 
Definition 6 A hitting set of a given bag or multiset M of elements from 2! is a set ! ⊆ ! such that the intersection between B and every set in M is nonempty. The set ! ∈ !"(!) is a minimal hitting set of M if B ceases to be a hitting set if any of its 
elements are removed. Let !"(!) and !"#(!) denote the sets of hitting sets and 
minimal hitting sets, respectively, !"(!) = {! ⊆ !|! ∩ !!   ≠ !    !"#  !""  !!   !"  !}. 
Definition 7 A approximate hitting set is a set that hits “enough” elements of the 
bag or multiset M. The approximate hitting set provides an approximate solution to the 
hitting set problem. The set of ε-approximate hitting sets of the multiset M is denoted !"#(!, !):  
!"# !, ! = ! ⊆ A !!  !"  !|!!∩!!∅  ! ≥ ! ,                                                           (4-5) 
where the parameter !  controls the degree of approximation. The set is a minimal !-
approximate hitting set if it ceases to be so if any of its elements are removed. The set of 
all minimal !-approximate hitting set is denoted !"#$(!, !). 
Definition 8 The significance of attribute is defined as: !"#(!,!,!) = !(!), !(!) 
is the number of appearing times of attribute a in the remain part of the discernibility 
matrix which removes all the elements that have nonempty intersection with R. 
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The work of Zainal et al. [34] has shown that the features set of the RSA in the KDD 
Cup 99 data set are service, flag, src_byte, srv_count, dst_host_count, and 
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate. And the performance of the intrusion detection system using 
rough set is shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 IDS performance using RSA feature selection [34] 
Type Detection Accuracy 
Normal 89.84% 
 
 
Attack 
DoS 99.34% 
Probe 99.63% 
U2R 100% 
R2L 100% 
Mean 99.743% 
 
As shown in Table 4-2, the rough set based IDS performs well in detecting the 
attack on the system. But the false alarm rate is really high, which needs further 
investigation.  
4.2.1.2  Linear Genetic Programming (LGP) 
LGP is a variant of the Genetic Programming (GP) technique that acts on linear 
genomes [50]. The main characteristics of LGP in comparison to the tree-based GP lies 
in that the evolvable units are the expressions of an imperative language like C or C++, 
but not the functional programming language like LISP. The LGP selection procedure 
can put the lowest selection pressure on the individuals by allowing only two individuals 
to participate in a tournament [45]. The winner copy will replace the loser of each 
tournament, so that the crossover points will only occur between instructions. While 
inside the instructions, the instruction identifier will be randomly replaced by the 
mutation operation. The maximum size of the program in LGP is usually restricted in 
order to prevent programs without bounds. For the reason that the LGP can be 
implemented at machine code level, it can be fast enough to detect real-time intrusions.  
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Sung and Mukkamala [45] indicate that for the LGP feature selection algorithm, the 
main focus is in representation of the space of all possible subsets of the given input 
feature set. The feature in the candidate feature set is considered as a binary gene. Each 
individual consisting of fixed-length binary string represents some subset of the given 
feature set.  For example, an individual with length ! corresponds to a d-dimensional 
binary feature vector Y. Each bit of the individual represents the elimination or inclusion 
of the associated feature. !! = 0 indicates elimination and !! = 1 means inclusion of the !!!feature. Fitness F of an individual program p is calculated as the mean square error 
(MSE) between the predicted output (!  !"!"#$) and the desired output (!  !"!"#) for all n 
training samples and m outputs [51]. 
F P = !!∗! O  !"!"#$ − O  !"!"# ! + !!!!!!!!!! CE = MSE+w ∗MCE  ,                                                    (4-6) 
where Classification Error (CE) is computed as the number of misclassifications. Mean 
Classification Error (MCE) is added to the fitness function while its contribution is 
proscribed by an absolute value of weight (W). 
The work of Sung and Mukkamala [45] indicated that the feature set of LGP in the 
KDD Cup 99 data set are service, src_byte, logged_in, rerror_rate, srv_diff_host_rate, 
dst_host_diff_srv_rate. The performance of the intrusion detection system using LGP is 
shown in Table 4-3. 
 
Table 4-3 IDS performance using LGP 
Type Detection Accuracy 
Normal 94.16% 
 
 
Attack 
DoS 99.8% 
Probe 100% 
U2R 60% 
R2L 100% 
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Mean 89.950% 
 
4.3 Efficient AIS Based IDS 
4.3.1 Normal Data Gathering Step 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the data used in this project is the KDD Cup 99 data 
set. For each single record in the data set, it contains 41 parameters. In our experiment, 
the feature selection algorithm is used (Section 4.2.1) to simplify the raw data in order to 
reduce the system complexity. So, the useful parameters need to be extracted from the 41 
parameters. Also, for the reason that the negative selection algorithm is used as the 
detector generation algorithm, the only data that need to collect are the normal behaviour 
data.  
The raw data in the KDD Cup 99 data set is like follows: 
• 0,tcp,http,SF,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0
.00,0.00,9,9,1.00,0.00,0.11,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal.	  
 
    The last pattern of each record in the data set represents its type (normal or attack). 
For all the records that end with the “normal”, the useful patterns will be extracted by 
using feature selection algorithm and saved. In our research, the normal data are 
collected from the kddcup.data.gz [44].  
4.3.2 Detector Generation Step 
In this step, all the detectors for the AIS will be generated and saved in a file. The 
core of this step is the matching rule that used in the negative selection algorithm. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, several algorithms have been proposed by different researchers. 
In this experiment, a normalized Mahhatan distance is used for its simplicity.  It is 
defined as following. 
                                                                                     (4-7)         D(A,B) = 1L
a(i)! b(i)
r(i)i=1
"
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Where A = {a(1), a(2) … a(L)} , B={b(1), b(2), … b(L) } are the two patterns to be 
considered. R= {r(1), r(2), … r(L)}, r(i) is the range of the pattern space. In the detector 
generation step, the  represents for the random generated data and the !(!) 
represents for the data from the KDD Cup 99 data set.  
In the negative selection process, a threshold should be defined. Let X Self, Y is a 
pattern generated randomly, if , then A and B are considered 
matching and B will be rejected. As both the attack detection rate and false alarm rate are 
the measurement of the system performance, the detection threshold is chosen in such a 
way that both rates are kept in reasonable levels. The threshold in our experiment is 0.4. 
The pseudocode of the negative selection process is showed as follows: 
Given a shape-space Σ! , the self set S and non-self set N. Σ! = S ∪ N  and Φ = S ∩ N. 
 input: S = set of self elements 
 output: D = set of detectors 
 begin 
1) Form a self set S in shape-space Σ! 
2) Randomly generate a L-dimension element, and compare this element with each of 
the element in S. 
3) If the randomly generated element fails to match any element in S, keep this 
element in set D.  
4) If the randomly generated element matches any element in S, back to step 1. 
end 
 
4.3.3  Abnormal Detecting Step 
The abnormal detecting part is the most important part in the intrusion detection 
system. And the core of this part is the matching algorithm that defines whether the input 
is a normal behavior or an attack. In this step, the testing data will be compared with all 
the detectors generated in Section 4.3.2 under certain matching rules. If the affinity 
between the testing data and the detectors is smaller than a threshold, which means the 
distance between the testing data and detector is really small. The testing data will 
consider as abnormal. 
Let !(!)  is the !!! pattern chosen by the feature selection algorithm and ! =(!!,!!,…!!) . !(!)  is the pattern !!!  pattern from each record in detector set and 
a(i)
∈
D(X,Y )< threshold
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! = (!!,!!,…!!). !(!) is the weight coefficient of each pattern. So, the weight based 
Affinity definition should be 
!""#$#%& = !! ! ! !!(!)!"#$%!!!!                                                                                   (4-8) 
The pseudocode of the detection process is shown as follow:  
 Given a shape-space Σ!, the testing data set T and detector set D. The normal data in the 
testing data set N and Abnormal data in the testing data set A. T = A ∪ N and Φ = A ∩N. 
 input:  T = set of testing data 
 output: N = set of normal data in the testing set; 
         A = set of abnormal data in the testing set 
 begin 
1) Form a testing data set T and a detector set D in shape-space Σ!. 
2) Compare the testing data with all the elements in the detector set D under 
certain decision-making algorithm.  
3) If the testing data matches any element in the detector set D, this testing data 
will be put in set A. Otherwise, this testing data will be put in set N.  
end 
 
4.4 System performance of the EAI 
In our experiment, the rough set algorithm (RSA) and LGP based EAI are tested. 
The RSA can provide a minimal subset of attributes that contains the same capability of 
objects classification as the whole set of attributes. It can dramatically decrease the 
complexity of the EAI and maintain the system performance. The LGP algorithm is 
tested because of its simplicity.  It is fast in detecting real-time intrusions as mentioned 
in Section 4.2.1.2. 
4.4.1 EAI using RSA 
For the proposed EAI using RSA, the training data is from kddcup.data.gz [44] and 
the testing data can be found in corrected.gz [44]. The training data contains 743 
megabytes and the testing data contains about 300,000 records. The performance of the 
EAI using rough set theory is shown in the following table.  
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Table 4-4 System Performance of EAI using RSA 
TP number FN number FP number TN number TP rate TN rate 
192121 47116 17 60746 80.31% 99.97% 
 
Comparing the Table 4-4 with Table 4-2, the EAI using rough set shows better false 
alarm rate, but with lower attack detection rate.  
 
4.4.2 EAI using LGP algorithm 
Similarly, the proposed EAI using LGP uses the same training data set and testing 
data set as the one uses rough set theory. The six parameters chosen by LGP from the 
KDD Cup 99 data set are service, src_byte, logged_in, rerror_rate, srv_diff_host_rate 
and dst_host_diff_srv_rate. The system performance of the EAI using LGP is shown in 
Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5 System Performance of EAI using LGP 
TP number FN number FP number TN number TP rate TN rate 
238880 357 9209 51554 99.85% 84.84% 
 
Comparing the system performance of the EAI using LGP with the normal IDS 
using LGP shown in Table 4-3, by using the EAI, the attack detection rate increases 
dramatically from 89.95% to 99.85%, while the normal detection rate decreases from 
94.16% to 84.84%.  
4.5 Conclusion 
As the performance shown in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5, it can be concluded that by 
introducing the AIS into the IDS, the system performance will be improved to some 
extent. It can either increase the TP rate or the TN rate. The problem is that by improving 
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one part, it will sacrifice the other part in the meantime. The major problem should be 
that the parameters chosen by the feature selection algorithms do not suit well for the 
EAI. It is assumed that all the parameters chosen by the feature selection algorithm have 
the same contributions to the performance of the AIS based IDS. But the reality might be 
that different parameters have different contributions on the system output. So, in 
Chapter 5, a weighted based feature selection is proposed for EAI in order to improve the 
IDS performance.  
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5 Weighted Feature Selection for EAI 
The experiment presented in Chapter 4 shows that, the system performance of the 
EAI is not good enough by using the normal feature selection. Different parameters used 
in EAI might have different contributions in detecting the abnormal behavior. So, in this 
Chapter, a weight based feature selection for EAI is proposed and tested.  
5.1 Methodology 
In our experiment, an improved weight based feature selection is introduced in the 
abnormal detection process. Comparing with the traditional feature selection algorithm, a 
weight coefficient will be applied for each pattern selected by the feature selection 
algorithm. The algorithm is shown as follows. 
Let !(!)  is the !!! pattern chosen by the feature selection algorithm and ! =(!!,!!,…!!) . !(!)  is the pattern !!!  pattern from each record in detector set and ! = (!!,!!,…!!). !(!) is the weight coefficient of each pattern. So, the weight based 
feather selection decision-making process should be 
                                      !""#$#%& = !! !(!)!!!! ∗ ! ! !! !!"#$%                                                                                                                   (5− 1)                                                                                  
The weight coefficient !(!) is unknown in our experiment. So the first thing is to 
find out a suitable weight coefficient for each parameter in different feature selection 
algorithms. For each feature chosen by rough set or LGP, a weight coefficient !(!) will 
be tested. The more contribution the parameter did for the performance of IDS, the larger 
the weight coefficient will be. From the normalized point of view, for both rough set and 
LGP, the total weight of the six parameters will fix at 36, i.e.  
         !! = 36!!!!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (5− 2) 
The exhaustive method is used in testing the weight coefficient. It is assumed that 
initially, each parameter has a weight of ‘6’ for all the six parameters chosen based on 
each feature selection algorithm. Then, one parameter will change by the step size of 1 
and the other five will change by the step size 0.2, which keep the total weight of the 
equation 36 unchanged. After one parameter falls to zero, one loop will be finished. 
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5.1.1 Weight distribution for RSA feature set  
This section presents the testing and selection of weight coefficient of the RSA 
feature set in our proposed EAI. The testing data can be found in corrected.gz [44]. It 
contains 300,000 records, and about 45 million bytes. Among those 300,000 records, 
239237 records are attack patterns and 60763 records are normal patterns.  
The six parameters chosen by the Rough Set theory are service, flag, src_byte, 
srv_count, dst_host_count, and dst_host_srv_rerror_rate (mentioned in Section 4.2.1.1). 
And the attack and normal detection quantities for each single changed parameter can be 
found in Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-6. In each figure, the horizontal axis represents for the 
weight of the single changed parameter, the left vertical axis represents for the number of 
attack detection (NoAD), and the right vertical axis represents for the number of normal 
confirmation (NoNC).   
 
 
Figure 5-1 Detection results with various "service" parameter weight 
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Figure 5-2 Detection results with various “flag " parameter weight  
 
Figure 5-3 Detection results with various "src_byte" parameter weight  
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Figure 5-4 Detection results with various "srv_count" parameter weight  
 
Figure 5-5 Detection results with various "dst_host_count" parameter weight  
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Figure 5-6 Detection results with various "dst_host_srv_rerror_rate" parameter 
weight  
As shown in Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-6, by changing the weight of each single 
parameter and keep the others the same, the attack and normal detection rates vary 
accordingly. The table 5-1 shows the attack detection range. As shown in table 5-1, for 
the parameter service, src_bytes and dst_host_count, the attack detection rate change 
more obviously with weight adjustment. The other three parameters can be considered to 
have low contributions to the IDS system performance and all these parameters can have 
a low and fixed weight coefficient in the following test. 
Table 5-1 Attack detection range for each single changed parameter in RSA 
Testing 
parameter 
service flag Src_bytes Src_count dst_host_ 
count 
Dst_host_srv_ 
rerror_rate 
Attack  
Detection  
Range 
185843 
to 
239237 
187200 
to 
237280 
169610 
to 
239237 
186953 
to 
239237 
181493 
to 
239237 
196076 
to 
239237 
 
Now the weight coefficient combination of the other three parameters needs to be 
tested. The exhaustive method is used to find the best weight coefficient combinations 
for the rough set theory. The system performance is shown in Figure 5-7.  
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Figure 5-7 IDS performance with different weight combinations for parameters 
service, src_bytes and dst_host_count from RSA feature set 
       In Figure 5-7, the horizontal axis represents the numbered experiments with 
different weight coefficient combinations of the three chosen parameters. The 
Experiment numbers and the weight coefficients variation are mapped in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Value of the weight coefficient combination for EAI with weighted RSA 
Experiment 
Number service src_bytes dst_host_count 
Group 
Number service src_bytes dst_host_count 
Group 
Number service src_bytes dst_host_count 
1 1 16 1 46 1 13 4 91 10 1 8 
2 2 15 1 47 2 12 4 92 1 9 8 
3 3 14 1 48 3 11 4 94 3 7 8 
4 4 13 1 49 4 10 4 95 4 6 8 
5 5 12 1 50 5 9 4 96 5 5 8 
6 6 11 1 51 6 8 4 97 6 4 8 
7 7 10 1 52 7 7 4 98 7 3 8 
8 8 9 1 53 8 6 4 99 8 2 8 
9 9 8 1 54 9 5 4 100 9 1 8 
10 10 7 1 55 10 4 4 101 1 8 9 
11 11 6 1 56 11 3 4 102 2 7 9 
12 12 5 1 57 12 2 4 103 3 6 9 
13 13 4 1 58 13 1 5 104 4 5 9 
14 14 3 1 59 1 12 5 105 5 4 9 
15 15 2 1 60 2 11 5 106 6 3 9 
16 16 1 1 61 3 10 5 107 7 2 9 
17 1 15 2 62 4 9 5 108 8 1 9 
18 2 14 2 63 5 8 5 109 1 7 10 
19 3 13 2 64 6 7 5 110 2 6 10 
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20 4 12 2 65 7 6 5 111 3 5 10 
21 5 11 2 66 8 5 5 112 4 4 10 
22 6 10 2 67 9 4 5 113 5 3 10 
23 7 9 2 68 10 3 5 114 6 2 10 
24 8 8 2 69 11 2 5 115 7 1 10 
25 9 7 2 70 12 1 6 116 1 6 11 
26 10 6 2 71 1 11 6 117 2 5 11 
27 11 5 2 72 2 10 6 118 3 4 11 
28 12 4 2 73 3 9 6 119 4 3 11 
29 13 3 2 74 4 8 6 120 5 2 11 
30 14 2 2 75 5 7 6 121 6 1 11 
31 15 1 2 76 6 6 6 122 1 5 12 
32 1 14 3 77 7 5 6 123 2 4 12 
33 2 13 3 78 8 4 6 124 3 3 12 
34 3 12 3 79 9 3 6 125 4 2 12 
35 4 11 3 80 10 2 6 126 5 1 12 
36 5 10 3 81 11 1 7 127 1 4 13 
37 6 9 3 82 1 10 7 128 2 4 13 
38 7 8 3 83 2 9 7 129 3 4 13 
39 8 7 3 84 3 8 7 130 4 4 13 
40 9 6 3 85 4 7 7 131 1 3 14 
41 10 5 3 86 5 6 7 132 2 2 14 
42 11 4 3 87 6 5 7 133 3 1 14 
43 12 3 3 88 7 4 7 134 1 2 15 
44 13 2 3 89 8 3 7 135 2 1 15 
45 14 1 3 90 9 2 7 136 1 1 16 
 
As shown in Figure 5-7, with the dynamic change of the weight coefficients, the 
attack and normal detection rates show an inverse correlation. A higher attack detection 
rate will correspond to a lower normal detection rate. The trade-offs between attack and 
normal detection accuracy need to be made. The purpose of the proposed EAI is to 
achieve a high true positive rate, and keep a relatively low false alarm rate.  According to 
Figure 5-7, the TN rate for the proposed rough set based IDS keeps in a high level 
(around 99%). And the TP rate of the IDS ranges from about 70% to nearly 99%. So, the 
focus of our proposed IDS is to find reasonable good attack detection accuracy. The 
acceptable system performance of those different coefficient combinations is the TP rate 
up to 99.98% and the TN rate up to 99.94%. The weight coefficient combination 
corresponded to that performance is that 3 for service, 6 for flag, 1 for src_bytes, 6 for 
src_count, 14 for dst_host_count and 6 for Dst_host_srv_rerror_rate.  
The comparisons of the system performance between EAI with weighted RSA and 
normal (or equal weighted) rough set theory is shown in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3 EAI performance of weight based RSA Feature set and normal RSA 
Feature Set 
Type Attack Detection Rate Normal Detection Rate 
Weight based rough set  99.98% 99.94% 
Normal rough set 80.31% 99.97% 
 
According to Table 5-3, by introducing the weighted based scheme, the performance 
of the proposed EAI improves significantly in detecting abnormal behaviors, nearly 
19%. Both the normal detection accuracy and attack detection rate can be above 99.9 
percent.  
 
5.1.2 Weight distribution for LGP Feature Set 
Similar as Section 5.1.1, in this section, the weight coefficient of each parameter for 
the LGP feature set, which, has six parameters, i.e. service, src_byte, logged_in, 
rerror_rate, srv_diff_host_rate and dst_host_diff_srv_rate. The numbers of correct attack 
and normal detections for varying weights on each parameter can be found in Figure 5-8 
to Figure 5-13. They are same as Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-6, the horizontal axis represents 
for the weight associated with the single testing parameter, the left vertical axis 
represents for the number of attack detection (NoAD), and the right vertical axis 
represents for the number of normal confirmation (NoNC).   
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Figure 5-8 Detection results with various “service” parameter weight  
 
 
Figure 5-9 Detection results with various "src_byte" parameter weight  
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Figure 5-10 Detection results with various "logged_in" parameter weight  
 
Figure 5-11 Detection results with various "rerror_rate" parameter weight  
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Figure 5-12 Detection results with various "srv_diff_host_rate" parameter weight  
 
 
Figure 5-13 Detection results with various "dst_host_diff_srv_rate" parameter 
weight  
Compared with Figure 5-1 ~ Figure 5-6, Figure 5-8 ~ Figure 5-13, have shown that 
even some features appears in both RSA feature set and LGP feature set, e.g. service and 
src_byte, the contributions to the IDS performance are quite different. The attack 
detection range for each testing parameter from LGP feature set is shown in Table 5-4. 
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Table 5-4 Attack detection range for each single changed parameter in LGP 
Testing 
parameter 
service src_byte logged_in rerror_rate srv_diff_host 
_rate 
dst_host_diff_srv 
_rate 
Attack  
Detection  
Range 
67828 
to 
239237 
0 
to 
239235 
236583 
to 
239237 
234309 
to 
239237 
213944 
to 
239237 
238159 
to 
239066 
 
Table 5-3 shows that three parameters, service, src_byte, and srv_diff_host_rate 
have a higher influence (measured by the range of attack detection quantity) on the 
system output than the others. Similarly to the rough set algorithm, the exhaustive 
method is used to find the best weight coefficient combinations of these three 
parameters. The performance of the EAI with weighted LGP intrusion detection system 
is shown in Figure 5-14. 
 
Figure 5-14 IDS performance with different weight combinations for parameters 
service, src_byte, and srv_diff_host_rate from LGP feature set 
The value of the weight coefficient combination for the EAI with weighted LGP is 
shown in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5 Value of the weight coefficient combination for EAI with weighted LGP 
Group 
Number service src_bytes srv_diff_host_rate 
Group 
Number service src_bytes srv_diff_host_rate 
Group 
Number service src_bytes srv_diff_host_rate 
1 1 16 1 46 1 13 4 91 10 1 8 
2 2 15 1 47 2 12 4 92 1 9 8 
3 3 14 1 48 3 11 4 94 3 7 8 
4 4 13 1 49 4 10 4 95 4 6 8 
5 5 12 1 50 5 9 4 96 5 5 8 
6 6 11 1 51 6 8 4 97 6 4 8 
7 7 10 1 52 7 7 4 98 7 3 8 
8 8 9 1 53 8 6 4 99 8 2 8 
9 9 8 1 54 9 5 4 100 9 1 8 
10 10 7 1 55 10 4 4 101 1 8 9 
11 11 6 1 56 11 3 4 102 2 7 9 
12 12 5 1 57 12 2 4 103 3 6 9 
13 13 4 1 58 13 1 5 104 4 5 9 
14 14 3 1 59 1 12 5 105 5 4 9 
15 15 2 1 60 2 11 5 106 6 3 9 
16 16 1 1 61 3 10 5 107 7 2 9 
17 1 15 2 62 4 9 5 108 8 1 9 
18 2 14 2 63 5 8 5 109 1 7 10 
19 3 13 2 64 6 7 5 110 2 6 10 
20 4 12 2 65 7 6 5 111 3 5 10 
21 5 11 2 66 8 5 5 112 4 4 10 
22 6 10 2 67 9 4 5 113 5 3 10 
23 7 9 2 68 10 3 5 114 6 2 10 
24 8 8 2 69 11 2 5 115 7 1 10 
25 9 7 2 70 12 1 6 116 1 6 11 
26 10 6 2 71 1 11 6 117 2 5 11 
27 11 5 2 72 2 10 6 118 3 4 11 
28 12 4 2 73 3 9 6 119 4 3 11 
29 13 3 2 74 4 8 6 120 5 2 11 
30 14 2 2 75 5 7 6 121 6 1 11 
31 15 1 2 76 6 6 6 122 1 5 12 
32 1 14 3 77 7 5 6 123 2 4 12 
33 2 13 3 78 8 4 6 124 3 3 12 
34 3 12 3 79 9 3 6 125 4 2 12 
35 4 11 3 80 10 2 6 126 5 1 12 
36 5 10 3 81 11 1 7 127 1 4 13 
37 6 9 3 82 1 10 7 128 2 4 13 
38 7 8 3 83 2 9 7 129 3 4 13 
39 8 7 3 84 3 8 7 130 4 4 13 
40 9 6 3 85 4 7 7 131 1 3 14 
41 10 5 3 86 5 6 7 132 2 2 14 
42 11 4 3 87 6 5 7 133 3 1 14 
43 12 3 3 88 7 4 7 134 1 2 15 
44 13 2 3 89 8 3 7 135 2 1 15 
45 14 1 3 90 9 2 7 136 1 1 16 
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Figure 5-14 and Table 5-5 show that the attack detection rate and the normal 
detection rate are also reversely correlated. Compared with the performance of EAI with 
weighted RSA, the LGP version has higher fluctuation on the two detection rates. The 
TP rate ranges from 20% to 100%, while the TN rate is ranging from 99% to 15%. 
Acceptable system performance should have relatively high normal confirmation rate 
and attack detection rate. As shown in Figure 5-14, one group of weight setting can 
achieve the following encouraging result, TP rate:  98.91% and the TN rate: 98.24%. The 
weight coefficient distribution is as following: 3 for service, 8 for src_byte, 6 for 
logged_in, 6 for rerror_rate, 7 for srv_diff_host_rate, and 6 for dst_host_diff_srv_rate. 
The comparison of the EAI performance between weight based LGP and traditional 
LGP algorithm is shown in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6 EAI performance of weight based LGP Feature set and normal LGP 
Feature Set 
Type Attack Detection Rate Normal Detection Rate 
Weight based LGP  98.91% 98.24% 
Normal LGP 99.85% 84.84% 
 
The Table 5-6 shows that, by introducing the weigh coefficient to the feature 
selected by the LGP, the false alarm of the EAI decreases dramatically, about 14%. The 
performance of the EAI with weighted LGP is not as good as the one using RSA  mainly 
because the RSA features presents better for the whole data set. But still, the LGP has its 
advantage because its feature extracting process is quicker and fit for real-time intrusion 
detection as discussed in Chapter 4. 
5.2 Discussion 
The IDS performances shown in Section 5.1 indicate that the introduction of the 
weigh coefficients into the feature selection algorithm can improve the performance of 
the system. The comparison of the performance of EAI with weighted features and other 
IDSs is shown in Table 5-7 
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Table 5-7 Comparisons of EAI with weighted features and other IDS systems 
Type Attack Detection Rate Normal Detection Rate 
EAI with weighted LGP  98.91% 98.24% 
EAI with weighted RSA  99.98% 99.94% 
MARS[45] 99.925% 84.9% 
SVDF[45] 99.928% 80.83% 
DT[42] 92.088% 99.998% 
HGMM[52] 98.775% 88.14% 
 
As shown in Table 5-7, the EAI with weighted RSA performs best comparing with 
other intrusion detection systems. By changing the weight coefficient of different 
parameters, the IDS system designers have greater flexibility in making tradeoffs 
between the TP rate and TN rate. The difficulty of the proposed scheme is the selection 
of the weight coefficients. The use of the exhaustive method in chosen the weight 
coefficients requires a lot of computing time. With all the system output from the 
exhaustive method, a trade-off between attack detection rate and false alarm rate needs to 
be made. A good intrusion detection system should have a high abnormal detection rate 
and relatively low false alarm rate. The advantage of the proposed weighted EAI is that it 
can suit different network circumstances by changing the weight coefficients.  
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6 Conclusion  
This research targets exploration of network intrusion detection (ID), an important 
sub area in network security. The objective is to further improve existing ID 
technologies’ detection accuracy and system complexity. The capability of detecting new 
attacks or virus is also required for the targeted intrusion detection system (IDS). After 
the most popular intrusion detection techniques are reviewed, Artificial Immune System 
(AIS), a bio inspired computing paradigm is selected for our research in ID. An efficient 
AIS based IDS (EAI) scheme is proposed in this thesis. The scheme relies on the 
detectors to detect the abnormal behaviour of the network. The detectors are generated 
by using the negative selection AIS algorithm. The nature of this scheme enables it to 
detect new attacks. Feature selection is to limit the features used in the scheme to be a 
small group which are more reprentitive from abnormal detection point of view. The 
small group means a low computing complexity. This is an issue in real time 
applications.  Two feature selection algorithms, rough set algorithm (RSA) and linear 
genetic programming (LPG), have been studied, compared and tested in the scheme. 
Rough set algorithm can provide a minimal subset of attributes that contains the same 
capability of objects classification as the whole set of attributes. LPG has its own 
advantages in process speed. That is why both algorithms are studied in this research.  
EAI with either RSA or LPG feature set has shown some encouraging results. However, 
as all selected features in both algorithms are treated equally in the EAI scheme, the 
detection performance should be further improved. For the reason that the selected 
features may not have equal contribution towards the detections, a weighted EAI is 
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proposed in aiming to further improve the detection performance. In the weighted 
scheme, all the features used should be assigned with individual weight associated with 
its contribution to the detection. The weight allocation is the main challenge. In this 
thesis, a simplified exhausted method is proposed in the weight selection. The weighted 
EAI with both RSA and LPG feature sets have been tested. The results show that the 
attack detection rate of the rough set based IDS can increase by 19.67% and the false 
alarm rate of the LGP based IDS can decrease by 13.4%. With both RSA and LPG, the 
weight EAI has made clear improvement in both attack detection rate and the normal 
confirmation rate. The best result obtained is from weighted EAI with RSA feature set. 
The TP rate is 99.98% and TN rate is 99.94%. The testing data is the popular KDD Cup 
99 data set [44]. In summary, the work conducted in this research has shown that 
artificial immune system has a big role to play in the intrusion detection area even there 
are some works yet to be done in real implementation. 
KDD CUP 99 is the most popular data set used in the intrusion detection research 
field, but it is more than eleven years old, may not reflect some new features and attacks 
of today’s networks.  With fast evolution of networks and the Internet, new updated data 
set recognized by the research community is needed. This is challenging work as the 
generation of the data set requires resources and proper design. Hopefully, Lincoln Lab 
will update their data set soon. Otherwise alternative test data needs to be obtained. 
Due to the time limit, the adaptiveness of AIS based IDS has not been explored.     
In our scheme, once the detectors are generated, they are supposed to be fixed in the live 
detection. However, some detectors may not detect anything for long time. Inclusion of 
these detectors in the searching process of the scheme may not add much value to the 
system. These inactive detectors can be put into a sleep mode for the scheme to have 
efficient computing. Also, a mechanism that can generate new detectors could be added 
to adapt to the network changes. These can be the future works in the area. 
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Abstract—With the increasing worldwide network attacks, 
intrusion detection (ID) has become a popular research topic in 
last decade. Several artificial intelligence techniques such as 
neural networks and fuzzy logic have been applied in ID. The 
results are varied. The intrusion detection accuracy is the main 
focus for intrusion detection systems (IDS). Most research 
activities in the area aiming to improve the ID accuracy.  In this 
paper, an artificial immune system (AIS) based network 
intrusion detection scheme is proposed. An optimized feature 
selection using Rough Set (RS) theory is defined.  The complexity 
issue is addressed in the design of the algorithms. The scheme is 
tested on the widely used KDD CUP 99 dataset. The result shows 
that the proposed scheme outperforms other schemes in detection 
accuracy.  
Keywords- Intrusion Detection, Negative selection, Artificial 
Immune System, KDD CUP 99 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Driven by the rapid growth of the computer network 
technologies, the security of the computer and network 
information is becoming increasingly important. The 
appearance of the new access technologies and the advanced 
devices has increased the possibilities of malicious attacks or 
service abuse by various hackers. Also, with the appearance of 
multimedia services (video, audio, image, text, etc.), a faster, 
short-delay anti-virus system is required. However, the 
traditional passive defence mechanisms like encryptions and 
firewalls cannot fully meet current security requirements.  
Therefore, a special attack and misuse detection system is 
needed. The intrusion detection system (IDS) is such a system, 
which is composed by a series of devices and software 
applications to monitor network activities in order to protect 
the system from malicious activities. 
The general IDS detect unauthorized users or processes by 
comparing a user’s behaviour with the user’s profile. Two 
approaches, misuse detection and anomaly detection, are 
usually used in the intrusion detection process. The misuse 
detection is used to detect the intrusion when the behavior of 
the system matches with any of the intrusion signatures in the 
user profile. And the anomaly detection, which is also called as 
outlier detection [1], is used to detect the intrusion when the 
given data set does not match with the established normal 
behavior. 
Various techniques have been used for building IDS, like 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) [2], Multivariate Adaptive 
Regression Splines (MARS) [3], and Linear Genetic 
Programming (LGP) [4], etc. Some of them give good 
performance in specific attack areas, while they might not 
detect other attacks well. In recent years, bio-inspired 
algorithms have been studied and applied in intrusion detection 
[5] aiming for better performance. Algorithms such as Genetic 
Algorithm (GA), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and 
Artificial Immune Systems are widely studied. AIS is a 
relatively new comer among them. The concept of AIS was 
proposed in mid 1980s. Farmer, Packard and Perelson [6], 
Bersini and Varela’s [7] work have started the area. AIS has 
not become a subject of its own untill mid 90s. It has been 
defined as: “Adaptive systems inspired by theoretical 
immunology and observed immune functions, principles and 
models, which are applied to problem solving.” by Castro and 
Timmis [8]. Early works of AIS based IDS can be found in [9]. 
A Multilayer IDS using AIS was proposed by Dasgupta [10] in 
order to provide systematic defense. These AIS based IDS have 
achieved good detection results. However, their computing 
complexity is quite high due to the complicated feature 
comparing. While, for IDS, responding time is also an 
important issue. The more complexity the system, the more 
computing time and the longer responding time will be. Large 
parameter set in IDS can increase the detection accuracy. 
However, the more parameters using, the more complex the 
system will be. So, the trade off between the complexity and 
the accuracy is a challenge.   Our study on AIS based IDS is to 
further improve its detection accuracy while keeping a low 
algorithm complexity.  
 In this paper, an improved AIS based intrusion detection 
system with Rough Set feature selection algorithm is presented. 
The anomaly detection in the system is set up based on AIS 
negative selection algorithm. And the feature selection 
algorithm is used to reduce the complexity of the system. The 
artificial immune system and the negative selection algorithm 
are introduced in Section II. The AIS based IDS is presented in 
Section III. Our experiment and results are illustrated in 
Section IV. Section V draws a conclusion and some future 
works are discussed.  
II. ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM 
     Artificial Immune System (AIS) applies to various areas of 
researches that attempt to build a bridge between immunology 
and engineering by using the techniques of mathematical and 
computational modeling of immunology.  
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The origin of AIS is rooted in the early theoretical work of 
J.D. Farmer, N.H. Packard, A.S. Perelson [11,12],F. Varela, A. 
Coutinho, B. Dupire, and N. Vaz [13]. It was first proposed in 
mid 1980s and became a subject of its own in mid 90s. 
Originally, AIS aimed to find efficient abstractions of 
processes in the immune system [14].  By carefully reviewing 
the efficient natural mechanism, a number of computer 
scientists proposed artificial immune based computer models to 
solve various problems ranging from virus detection, fault 
analyzing to clustering. Two researchers, Hugues 
Bersini and Stephanie Forrest, played an important role in 
crossing the divide between computing and immunology. 
Bersini and Forrest did a lot of basic works rooted from 
immunology and their works formed a solid foundation of the 
area of AIS. With regards to Bersini, he was focusing on the 
basic theory of immune network and examining how the 
immune system maintained its memory and how to build a 
model to mimic that progress.  And for Forrest, she was 
focusing on the application area of the AIS. She proposed the 
idea of introducing the immune system into the computer 
security area by using its ability to distinguish between self and 
non-self. 
Negative selection, which is proposed by Forrest et al. [15], 
is inspired from the negative selection process of the adaptive 
immune system [16]. The important characteristic of the 
human immune system is that it can maintain its diversity and 
generality, and it can detect a large number of antigens by 
using a small number of antibodies. In order to make it 
possible, several functions will be processed [17].  One of 
those functions is to develop the antibodies through the gene 
library. The gene library will be used in creating thymus cell (T 
cell) and bone marrow cell (B cell). While creating a new 
antibody, the gene segments in the gene library will be 
randomly selected and assembled. As shown in Figure 1, large 
number of antibodies can be generated from combining 
different genes segments in the gene library. 
 
Figure 1.  Gene Expression Process [27] 
 
However, there is a problem due to the full immune 
response above. Not only responding to harmful antigens, those 
new generated antibody may also react to self-cells coming 
from the host. In order to protect the body from self-reactive, 
the human immune system produces the negative selection.  
In the case of an anomaly detection domain, the algorithm 
prepares a set of exemplar pattern detectors trained on normal 
(non-anomalous) patterns that model and detect unseen or 
anomalous patterns [18].  The principle of the negative 
selection is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Principle of Negative Selection 
As shown in Figure 2, the basic idea of the negative 
selection is to generate a selected detector set D and use the 
detector set to distinguish the new data. In the process, a set of 
detectors R will be randomly generated, and all the randomly 
generated detectors will be compared with each elements of the 
self-string set S. Under certain matching algorithms, if the 
detector in set R fails to match any element in S, it will be 
saved in the detector set D, otherwise, it will be rejected.  
In the matching process, several algorithms have been 
proposed to determine the difference between self and non-self 
like Eucliden distance, hamming distance, r-contiguous bit rule 
algorithm, etc. In this paper, the Manhattan Distance will be 
used because of its simplicity. The affinity (difference) of the 
set R and S are related to the distance between them. The 
definition of the distance is shown as follows  
             Let R=<R1, R2… Rm>, S=<S1, S2… Sm>, 
Manhattan !
=
"=
m
i
ii SRD
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In the intrusion detection process, for any pattern to be 
checked, it needs to be compared with all the patterns in the 
detector set. If it matches to any pattern in the detector set it 
will be considered as a non-self element, otherwise, it will be 
considered as self. AIS has been found applications in many 
areas such as optimization, data analysis, machine learning, 
pattern recognition, etc and network intrusion detection which 
is the focus of this paper.  
III. AIS BASED IDS 
Generally, network intrusion detection is based on the 
examination of monitored network parameters. Different 
examine algorithms lead to different IDS. The general AIS 
based IDS [20] [21] [22] can be divided into two parts, i.e. 
detector set generation and the live detection. To form the 
detection set, negative selection algorithm is applied,  as 
discussed in Section I I .  In the live detection stage, a 
monitored network parameter pattern is compared with 
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detectors in the detector set. If it is matched with any detector, 
then a network intrusion is detected.  
A compact and effective detector set can reduce the 
algorithm computing complexity.  For detectors that do not 
contribute any detection in a period of time, they should be 
removed or put to a sleeping state.  Therefore, all the mature 
detectors will have a time_to_live (TTL) parameter. Whenever 
detection is occurred, all detectors’ TTLs will be deducted by 
one except for the detector which detects the intrusion.  Its 
TTLwill be reset to the maximum. When a detector reaches its 
lifetime, ie its TTL becomes zero; this detector will be become 
inactive. 
a) The definition of immune elements in AIS 
 
Antigens (Ag): numerical character strings with L elements, 
where L is the number of features selected from the dataset.          
Ag contains two subsets that are Self (normal patterns) and 
Nonself (abnormal patterns): 
Ag = {Self ,Nonself }                                                     (1) 
!="NonselfSelf                                                        (2) 
Detectors (Antibodies): The Antibodies Ab should have the 
same number of elements as the antigens Ag. Ab is expected to 
be representatives of all Nonself. 
Affinity: The measurement to judge the matching between 
two patterns. Generally, distance is used to measure the affinity 
of two patterns. The shorter the distance, the closer these two 
patterns are in the defined L space.  
In our project, a normalized Mahhatan distance is used for 
its simplicity.  It is defined as following. 
D(A,B)=1L
a(i)!b(i)
r(i)i=1
"                                                       (3) 
    Where A = {a(1), a(2) … a(L)} , B={b(1), b(2), … b(L) } 
are the two patterns to be measured.  
R= {r(1), r(2), … r(L)}, where r(i) represents the range of 
the ith parameter in the detection feature subset. 
     Two thresholds are defined. Ta is the threshold, used for 
detector set generation in the negative selection algorithm. Let 
X!Self, Y is a pattern generated randomly, If <),( YXD  Ta, 
then A and B are considered matching and B will be rejected. 
Otherwise B will be added to the detector set Ab. The second 
threshold, Td, is for live detection. Whenever a live pattern 
matches any of the patterns in Ab, the alarm will be raised. In 
our scheme, different Td has been tested to find a trade-off 
between the attack detection accuracy and false alarm rate.  
b) Parameter Quantization  
 
As shown in Table 1, the KDD Cup 99 features are in one 
of the following formats, i.e. continuous, discrete, or symbolic. 
To prepare the parameters in the detection subset for AIS, they 
should be quantized or normalized. For symbolic features such 
as protocol_type (3 symbols), service (70 symbols), and flag 
(11 symbols), they are mapped to numerical values ranging 
from 0 to N-1 where N is the number of symbols. 
IV. KDD CUP 99 WITH ROUGH SET THEORY 
 
The data set used in our experiment is the KDD Cup 99 
data set, which is the most widely used data set for network-
based intrusion detection. This data set is built based on the 
data captured in DARPA’98 IDS evaluation program [23]. The 
data set contains 24 training attack types and 14 additional 
attack types in the test data only. It has 41 parameters in each 
data record and the data type is shown as follows: 
• 0,tcp,http,SF,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,
0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,9,9,1.00,0.00,0.11,0.00
,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal. 
• 0,icmp,ecr_i,SF,1032,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,511,
511,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,
1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,smurf. 
Each parameter in the data string has its own meaning which is 
shown in Table 1. The complexity is so high if all the 41 
parameters are used and the responding time of the IDS will be 
slow. A feature selection is needed to minimize the data set.  
Table 1 KDD CUP 99 parameter 
No. Feature No. Feature 
1 duration 2 protocol_type 
3 Service 4 flag 
5 src_bytes 6 dst_bytes 
7 land 8 wrong_fragment 
9 Urgent 10 hot 
11 num_failed_logins 12 logged_in 
13 num_compromised 14 root_shell 
15 su_attempted 16 num_root 
17 num_file_creations 18 num_shells 
19 num_access_files 20 num_outbound_cmds 
21 is_hot_login 22 is_guest_login 
23 count 24 srv_count 
25 serror_rate 26 srv_serror_rate 
27 rerror_rate 28 srv_rerror_rate 
29 same_srv_rate 30 diff_srv_rate 
31 srv_diff_host_rate 32 dst_host_count 
33 dst_host_srv_coun 34 dst_host_same_srv_rate 
35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate 36 
dst_host_same_src_port_
rate 
37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 38 dst_host_serror_rate 
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate 40 dst_host_rerror_rate 
41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate   
 
Rough Set Theory (RST), first proposed by Polish 
computer scientist Zdzis!aw I. Pawlak, is an extension of 
conventional set theory that supports approximations in 
decision-making [19]. It is a mathematical tool for decision 
support and suits well for the classification of objects. A lot of 
researches have been focused in the RST-based machine 
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learning and decision area recently. The m jor advantage of the 
RST compared with other feature selection algorithm is its 
simplicity. A minimal rule set can be generated by using RST. 
That makes Rough Set Theory suitable for real-time decision 
tasks. 
The work of Zhang et al. [25] has shown that RST showed 
high detection accuracy and feature ranking was fast in 
determining the categories of the attacks in IDS. And Zainal et 
al. [26] has shown that the IDS have performed well by using 
RST and the six highest rank features by RST were Service, 
flag, src_bytes, srv_count, dst_host_count, 
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate in table 1. But unfortunately, the false 
alarm rate in Zainal’s research is relatively high. 
In our scheme, an improved rough set theory is introduced. 
By using the six parameters chosen from the KDD Cup 99 data 
set, each parameter is associated with a ‘weight’. The weights 
for the six parameters are different because of the different 
contributions of these parameters to the system performance. A 
range of the weights have been tested in our experiment in 
order to find a suitable one for the AIS based intrusion 
detection system. 
 
V.     RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The raw dataset that we used to generate detectors contains 
about five million connection records, 700 million bytes. 
Meanwhile, the testing data we choose contains 300,000 
records, and about 45 million bytes.  In our scheme, as 
described in Section IV, different parameters chosen by the 
Rough set need to give different weight. Before a weight is 
finalized, an “influence factor” is tested for each parameter.  
Originally, an AIS based intrusion detection system is built 
based on the C++ platform. In the negative selection process, 
each parameter has a weight of ‘6’ for all the six parameters 
chosen based on rough set theory, and the total weight is equal 
to 36. Then, one parameter will change by the step size of 1 
and the other five will change by the step size 0.2, which keep 
the total weight of the equation 36 unchanged. According to 
the test data we use in the KDD Cup 99 data set, 239237 
attacks are contained. And the attack detection quantity for 
different parameters is shown in the Figure 3. The   
As shown in Figure 3, by changing the weight of each 
single parameter and keep the others the same, the attack 
detection number will change in the meantime. The table 2 
below shows the different attack detection accuracy for each 
single changed parameter. 
Table 2 Attack detection range for each single changed 
parameter 
Parameter  
Type 
service flag Src_bytes Src_count dst_host_ 
count 
Dst_host_srv_ 
rerror_rate 
Attack  
Detection  
Range 
185843 
to 
239237 
187200 
to 
237280 
169610 
to 
239237 
186953 
to 
239237 
181493 
to 
239237 
186076 
to 
239237 
 
As shown in table 2, for the parameter service, src_bytes and 
dst_host_count, the detection quantity changed more obviously 
than the other three. To reduce the computing complexity, in 
our scheme, the other three parameters will keep invariant. In 
order to find a best parameter weight combination for the rough 
set theory, the exhaustive method is used. All the combination 
of the chosen parameters (service, src_bytes and 
dst_host_count) is tested and the detection accuracy is shown 
in Figure 4. 
In Figure 4, Series 1 represents the attack detection 
accuracy, and Series 2 represents the normal detection 
accuracy. As shown in Figure 4, the system detection accuracy 
shows a significant improvement with different weighting 
factors of the parameter.  The true positive rate (TP rate) can up 
to 98.25% (with TN rate 99.90%), and the true negative rate 
(TN rate) up to 99.97 (with TP rate 82.03%).  
     In general, compared with the original rough set based IDS 
[26], by introducing the “weight” scheme, the proposed IDS 
provided a better TN rate (above 99% compared with 89.95%), 
and relatively high TP rate. Fine tuning the algorithm in feature 
selection and parameter quantization could lead to further 
improvement on detection rate and complexity. 
 
Figure 3.  Attack Detection Quantity 
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